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Party politics, civil society and local democracy –  





Party politics is generally absent from urban governance or urban politics theories or debates, or present 
only anecdotally or as a ‘black box’, whilst they are more and more described, especially in Cities of the 
South, as central to urban societies, access to resources and social dynamics. This paper attempts, through 
the case of the role of the ANC in civil society in Johannesburg, to uncover some of the place of political 
parties in urban governance. It first argues that the party local branch is often crucial as a platform of 
mobilization, expression and debates around local needs, being more structured and able to access channels 
of decision than other civil society organizations or local government participatory structures. However, its 
strong embededness in urban local societies also means a form of social control restricting the ability of 
civil society to revolt and challenge urban policies more radically. 
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1. Introduction 
The 2009 attack of the social movement 
Abahlali baseMjondolo
1
, violently driven 
out of their eThekwini stronghold, 
Kennedy Road informal settlement, by 
African National Congress (ANC) local 
branch activists, with the support of the 
police and the Provincial government, 
indicates how much local party politics 
matters in neighborhood dynamics, civil 
society structure and local democracy 
more broadly. It raises the question of the 
ANC’s commitment to democracy, as 
indicated by Steven Friedman (2009), and 
of its ability to tolerate different, 
oppositional views, especially in low-
income areas where the number of service 
delivery protests keeps increasing
2
.  
                                                 
1 Abahlali baseMjondolo (Zulu meaning “The 
people who live in shacks”) is a social movement 
born in eThekwini (former Durban) in 2005, in 
opposition to the municipal policies of 
“eradication” of informal settlements. It has 
recently won a court case declaring 
unconstitutional the provincial act on ‘Slum 
Elimination and Prevention of Re-emergence of 
Slums’ (Huchzermeyer, 2009). 
2 “Service delivery protests” are mass urban 
protests from low-income residents demanding 
better (material, but also political) access to urban 
Academic debates in the last decade have 
raged on the nature of South African 
democracy, given the ANC dominant 
position (Gilliomee and Simkins 1999, 
Southall 2001). Some researchers suggest 
that ANC dominance might be a 
necessary, temporary condition for state 
stability and reconstruction (Butler 2000), 
and that ANC dominance does not prevent 
democratic debate, within the ANC on the 
one hand; outside of the ANC with civil 
society, on the other (Friedman 2003). 
This paper attempts to look at those spaces 
for democratic debate at the local level, 
using five neighborhoods in Johannesburg 
as case studies of different political 
contexts (see Table 1), by unraveling the 
ways in which a mass political party such 
as the ANC
3
 deploys its strategy locally.  
 
                                                                      
basic services (Friedman 2010). They are being 
followed closely by central government, especially 
in the context of upcoming 2011 local elections. 
See COGTA (2010). 
3 A mass party not only entails the mass of its 
affiliates, but also the role members are supposed 
to play in the party, and how the party structures 
reflect the importance of members’ participation 
(Darracq, 2008). 
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Table 1: Characteristics of Case Study 
Neighborhoods  
 






Inner city ANC led - 
Area 
B 
Inner city Non-ANC Two wards 
B1 & B2 
Area 
C 





















The paper is based on in-depth 
ethnographic research conducted since 
2006, complemented with observations 
gathered as an activist engaging locally 
around issues of xenophobia. Research 
included in-depth interviews with key 
local leaders (ward committee members, 
councilors, party branch executive 
members, community policing, street 
committee and community-based 
organization leaders) and participant 
observation in many public and collective 
meetings, at the local and municipal 
levels.  
 
The paper argues that the ANC is key in 
brokering the relationship between low 
income-residents and the state. It examines 
the way in which the party plays this 
brokerage role, and the consequences it 
has for local democracy. After exploring 
the existing (scarce) literature on the topic, 
the paper unfolds in two main directions. 
Firstly, it analyses how local party 
branches animate collective and social life, 
and allows for residents’ expression of 
local needs, which are otherwise not heard 
by the often dysfunctional participatory 
structures of local government. Secondly, 
the paper reflects on ways in which local 
party branches interact with other civil 
society organizations, and shows how they 
are able to exert an important social 
control over local public debates. 
 
2. Preamble 
Literature on party politics has mainly 
focused on politics at national level, and 
has seldom paid attention to local politics, 
especially urban politics. While there is a 
vast literature on urban politics -
constructed as a sub-discipline on its own 
(Sapotichne et al. 2007)- it mostly focuses 
on the relationship between urban 
government and non-state actors such as 
business lobbies and civil society 
organizations. Party politics is generally 
absent, only anecdotal, and in any case 
vastly under-theorized, in understanding 
“who governs” the city. For example, 
classic theories of urban regimes (Stone 
1989) and their avatars
4
 state that party 
politics hardly matters, as growth or 
neoliberal coalitions persist in time and 
outlast, at least in their strategic direction 
if not in their specific agents, electoral 
change. Studies in terms of “political 
machines”, which were central in early 
approaches of American urban politics 
(Callow 1976), do not seem to have been 
pursued as a research field – possibly 
because political machines were seen as 
ephemeral, a testimony of traditional 
politics that would be swept away by the 
consolidation of democracy. While 
broader studies on clientelism have 
contested this understanding (Briquet and 
Sawicki 1998, Kitschelt and Wilkinson 
2007), they seldom come down to the 
urban, local level. Contemporary studies 
on urban clientelism remain scarce, except 
in some of the Latin American literature 
                                                 
4 See debates on the rescaling of the state, 
neoliberalism and the city (Brenner and Theodore 
2005). 
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on cities (see Gay 1998 for a good 
summary; Auyero 1999, Auyero et al 
2009); and, increasingly, in Indian 
literature (Benjamin 2004, Chatterjee 
2004).  
Chatterjee offers in this respect a useful 
conceptual dichotomy, opposing “civil 
society” to “political society”. He argues 
that the notion of civil society, resting on a 
universal conception of citizenship, 
individual rights and relationship with the 
State, is limited to a narrow socio-
economic elite in cities of the South. In 
contrast, he argues that the majority of 
residents, whose lives can at least partly be 
characterized by informality (housing, 
employment), constitute the “political 
society” – engaging the state not with a 
full citizen’s status (due to the “illegal” 
position they are in) but on more flexible, 
blurred and precarious terms. The 
informality of their position leads them 
constantly to have to engage in informal 
arrangements with party politics, local 
politicians, councilors and administrations. 
This is a permanent feature of low income 
residents’ relationship with the state: it is 
not, for him, a temporary step towards full 
citizenship, as it would be argued by other, 
more optimistic, scholars (see literature on 
“insurgent citizenships”, or “degrees” of 
citizenship envisaged as steps towards full 
recognition of the marginalized or 
disenfranchised by state and society: 
Holston 2008; Miraftab 2009). In 
particular, while collective resistance and 
mobilization might yield temporary 
successes (against eviction, for access to 
certain urban goods and services, etc.), 
Chatterjee does not glorify them as a 
possible revolutionary movements, but 
places them in the existing power 
structure, and stresses the constant need 
for renegotiation, depending on shifts in 
political alliances, opportunities and 
contexts. Whilst this view is limited and 
limiting in enabling one to understand 
social change, it also seems closer to the 
everyday realities of urban governance in 
a majority of low-income neighborhoods – 
where radical social or political change is 
not what is at stake.  
This framework is helpful in carving a key 
role for party politics in cities of the 
South: however, Chatterjee’s analysis does 
not focus on party politics per se – their 
place, roles and strategies at a local or 
metropolitan level. And yet, many African 
cities specialists call for a better 
understanding of party politics in urban 
governance (Tostensen et al. 2001, Simone 
2004a, Lindell 2008, Pieterse and Van 
Donk 2008). Understanding the politics of 
a place and more precisely political 
parties' strategies is crucial for unraveling 
the dynamics of urban violence (ethnic or 
religious riots for instance: Dorier-Apprill 
1997); the persistence of groups of thugs 
and militias, important agents of daily 
urban management, that have often been 
supported and structured, at least at a stage 
of their development, by political parties 
(Fourchard and Albert 2003, Anderson 
2002, Kagwanja 2006); everyday access to 
resources and livelihood strategies of low-
income residents, for which the local party 
leader is a patron as much as the 
traditional healer, local chief or youth 
representative can be (Simone 2004b); and 
the African specificities of urban 
governance, such as the importance of 
ethnic linkages, contributing to the 
ethnicization of party politics (Tostensen 
et al 2001, Rakodi 2002). 
 
Why is it then, that this area of research is 
relatively unexplored? Low (2007) 
explains it by the fact that, within the 
discipline of political studies, broader 
scales of analysis (international, national, 
sometimes regional) are more prestigious, 
falling into the field of international 
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relations or nation-state building. On the 
contrary, party politics at the local scale 
are considered unimportant as they seldom 
change the face of the world. To this lack 
of prestige, one can add the moral 
discredit attached to local party politics: it 
is considered, not only in popular 
discourse, corrupt, the realm of personal 
interest and of quest for power or financial 
gain, in opposition to the supposedly more 
“authentic” politics of the people, as 
studied by the vast literature on social 
movements (McAdam 1996, Tarrow 
1998). The relationship between “high 
politics” and “petty politics” is seen as 
antagonistic rather than as two faces of the 
same coin
5
. In African contexts more 
specifically, this absence can also be 
explained by the political dangers of 
unraveling and exposing parties’ strategies 
in authoritarian countries, or countries in 
which state and party violence remains a 
usual if not legitimate way of fighting 
political opposition. This silence might 
also be attributed to the fact that, relative 
to Latin American or Indian contexts, the 
existence of multiparty political systems is 
recent in Africa
6
, as well as the rise of 
urbanization and the emergence of large 
metropolitan areas. 
 
3. ANC local branches as spaces of 
local democracy 
 
Coming back to South Africa, Friedman 
(2003) argues, in the controversy on the 
nature of South African democracy in a 
dominant party system, that the ANC 
provides a space for internal (democratic) 
debate. Debates are firstly occurring 
within the ANC structures – although it is 
                                                 
5 This absence of theoretical articulation is highly 
problematic, both in principle and in practice, as 
experienced when doing fieldwork (Bénit-Gbaffou 
2010).  
6 I am grateful to René Otayek for this suggestion. 
not clear whether factionalism
7
 has opened 
more space for debate or on the contrary 
made debate more difficult (Friedman 
2010). There is also a level of debate 
between different scales or levels of the 
party – local (ward), zonal (comprising 
several wards, often reflecting functional 
regions), regional (corresponding to 
metropolitan boundaries), provincial and 
national. Darracq (2008) has shown how 
local branches were given more political 
weight in the party in the context of 
Polokwane political battle between the 
Mbeki and the Zuma factions, since they 
were sending delegates who ultimately had 
the voting power. 
These are the two dimensions of 
democratic, participatory spaces (that one 
might call horizontal and vertical 
respectively) that I would like to explore, 
in relation to local urban issues confronted 
by residents. The horizontal dimension 
refers to the debates within the branch; the 
vertical dimension relies on the possible 
ability of local branches to bring issues up 
the ANC hierarchy, in a bottom-up 
movement, and to actually get answers 
from this hierarchy. 
 
3.1. The party branch, 
more accountable to local 
residents than the ward 
committee? 
Not all the branches are functional at all 
times, but in some places, the local ANC 
                                                 
7 Factionalism (battles within the party) has been 
increasing in the ANC since the mid-2000s. Battles 
for power crystallized in what is referred to as 
‘Polowkane’- the 52nd ANC national conference 
held in 2007 in Polokwane, opposing two 
candidates for party leadership: Thabo Mbeki (then 
South African president) and Jacob Zuma (current 
President). The victory of the Zuma faction led to 
the creation of a new party, seceding from the 
ANC (COPE, Congress of the People); to the 
election of Zuma as the South African president in 
2009; and to ongoing factional divisions at all 
levels of the party and state structures. 
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branch constitutes the only structured 
organization holding regular, well-
attended meetings. The ability of the ANC 
to attract masses relies possibly on 
political deeply entrenched loyalties, but 
also pragmatically on members’ strategies 
for access to resources
8
. Indeed, the ANC, 
as the dominant party and the party in 
power, is seen as able to deliver, to get 
members access to information and to 
resources.  
The party is certainly not the only space 
where people fish for opportunities 
(Mbembe and Roitman 2002, Simone 
2004a); but it is a crucial one. Significant 
is the question raised by a member in such 
an ANC branch general meeting (area B1, 
15.04.09): “If I am not an ANC member, 
can I access this [social] service?”, as well 
as the answer he obtained – that it was a 
government service, so he could; but that 
of course, ANC might help. While such an 
answer is directly building up clientelist 
relationships, it is also probably true: the 
ANC often acts as a broker between low-
income residents and the state, by virtue of 
being accessible, “on the ground”, aware 
of the different public opportunities on 
offer, and able to navigate the 
complexities of the South African state 
apparatus (Bénit-Gbaffou forthcoming). 
In many ways, ANC local branches are 
competing with local government 
participatory structures
9
. For instance, they 
                                                 
8 As theorized by Gaxie (1977) in his analysis of 
activism: individuals join a party for “collective 
incentives” (ideology, identity, solidarity) and/or 
for “selective incentives” (material – money, 
contract, resources, or symbolic - social status, 
recognition, network). 
9 The post-apartheid state is committed to both 
redistribution (to correct the ills of the past) and 
participation (as form of exercise of democratic 
rights that the majority has been deprived of for 
decades) – sometimes conflicting objectives. 
Participation at the local level is organized mainly 
through ward committees: elected representatives 
working with the ward councilor to facilitate 
mimic the structures and functions of ward 
committees. In Area B1, the branch 
created several sub-committees around the 
key functions theoretically performed by 
the ward committee: Housing, Safety and 
Security, Environment, Job and Training, 
etc.
 
In a ward led by an opposition party, 
doubling up the (opposition-dominated) 
ward committee might be an explicit 
strategy to overtake the functions of the 
ward committee. But it also reflects the 
needs to deal with the most pressing urban 
local issues; it allows for building 
membership and mobilizing members, for 
instance through organizing weekly local 
housing surveys, encouraging participation 
in street patrols, etc. It is not always 
unproblematic: in area A, the ANC Youth 
League, led by a few turbulent young men, 
regularly proposes (in public and in ANC 
meetings) to tackle the question of 
“hijacked buildings”10: they call for local 
youth to carry out surveys of the hijacked 
buildings in the area, and chase away the 
“foreigners” (migrants from the rest of the 
African continent) who they consider 
responsible for local social ills. 
The ward committee structure has been 
shown (Bénit-Gbaffou 2008) to be 
dysfunctional as a means to bring 
residents’ issues at a higher, for instance 
metropolitan, level. Ward councilors 
indeed do not have much power, nor much 
say in Council (with obvious variations 
according to each councilor’s personal 
political network), whilst they have huge 
responsibilities: they are presented as the 
                                                                      
communication between voters and the 
municipality. 
10 “Hijacked buildings” are buildings which have 
been taken over by a group of residents (chasing 
away legitimate owners or tenants, or using the fact 
that the building is vacant or the owner absent). 
They can be, when the building hijackers are 
running criminal activities, crime “hot spots” – but 
it is not always the case, as the situation mainly 
reflects the housing crisis. 
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agents of service delivery as well as the 
channel of communication between the 
Council and residents. Their lack of power 
is due to several factors: first, in 
Johannesburg especially, the Council does 




councilors often do not have a direct 
interest in bringing issues from the 
bottom-up, especially issues that might 
challenge public policies adopted by the 
ANC municipal or national government: 
they are less accountable to their voters 
than to the party regional hierarchy, which 
will decide, in the last resort, which ANC 
member is to be the ANC candidate for the 
ward. There is evidence that locally-
grounded leaders have often been 
discarded in favor of candidates less 
locally legitimate but more powerful in the 
party
12
 (Box 1; Box 10; see also Low et al. 
2007). 
 
Box 1 - The grounded activist versus the party 
animal 
 
There were two possible ANC candidates for the 
2006 municipal election: one (female) active, 
grounded social worker in the area; and one (male) 
outsider (actually not living in the neighbourhood), 
qualified by others as a “party animal”. The latter 
was chosen eventually. The former, maybe as 
compensation, was appointed Community 
Development Worker (CDW) by the Gauteng 
Provincial Government – a position that 
structurally competes with the councillor’s as its 
function is very similar: to help residents accessing 
public services and liaising with local government. 
In an opposition-led ward like Area B2 (as the 
ANC candidate was defeated), competition 
between the councilor and the CDW is even more 
obvious. 
                                                 
11 With two exceptions (a Soweto and an Inner City 
committee), but which limited power. 
12 Decisions by regional ANC structures can 
overturn local branches’ nominations, using several 
types of arguments (like the rule for gender equity, 
or racial representativeness, for instance). However 
it does not have a total freedom to appoint a 
candidate (Darracq 2008). 
 
Within the branch, competition continues between 
the two types of ANC leaders (on-the-ground 
versus politically-astute). It takes the form of 
constant debates on the branch’s activities and 
strategies - to be focused on social or on political 
activities. Such a debate arose when it was time for 
the ANC to choose ANC candidates for the 
election of ward committee members – the local 
activist wanted to nominate local leaders according 
to their skills (for instance the CPF chair, also an 
ANC executive member, for the portfolio of Safety 
and Security); while the party animal rather wanted 




The grounded activist/ party-animal 
dichotomy is not the only one that features 
in ANC internal debates. Representation 
of different sub-constituencies in the 
branch can reflect social and spatial 
diversity within the ward, and therefore 
help shape collective debate around local 
issues, urban governance, and policy 
priorities (Gervais-Lambony 2008). A 
contrario, failure to recognize this 
diversity is a matter of debate (Box 2): 
 
Box 2 - Diversity within the party branch – 
accommodate difference, or else… 
 
(Fieldwork diary, 12.07.2006) 
 
I had expected with great impatience the day of the 
ward committee elections in [area C2]. Won by a 
Democratic Alliance (DA)13 councillor in 2006, the 
ward was to be the ground of a political battle, and 
the ANC local branch had been actively preparing 
a take-over strategy, selecting its candidates to 
stand as ward committee members.  
The local community hall was surprisingly packed. 
The ANC local branch leader was in heated 
discussion with a group brought by collective taxi 
from a nearby Black informal settlement. As this 
settlement (included in 2005 in ward C2) 
represented the ANC stronghold in this 
traditionally DA township, the ANC branch had 
made sure the ANC members from the informal 
settlement were present at the election – although 
they were marginalised in the branch executive 
                                                 
13 The main opposition party in South Africa. 
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committee, dominated by middle-class Coloured 
residents. The branch executive had attributed them 
some positions as candidates, but not the ones 
considered the most important (environment, 
corporate services – not housing, infrastructures).  
The invited members (50 to 60 people) went into 
the hall, waited for the DA councillor to open the 
session, and then left the hall, leaving their seat 
empty: as if saying “we are not voting cattle!”. 




This revolt by a fraction of the ANC 
branch, leading to a political defeat for the 
ANC, showcased the power of differing 
groups to be heard and eventually shift 
power balances within the branch. Beyond 
mere political factionalism, different living 
conditions, different racial groups, 
different urban challenges experienced by 
ANC leaders and their group can therefore 
inform internal debates and positions: 
there is some scope within the branch for 
difference and competition – making the 
branch a space for democratic debate, 
permeated by local urban issues.  
ANC members are indeed, often more than 
councilors or ward committee members, in 
contact with everyday residents’ needs and 
challenges. In electoral times, and as the 
ANC is a mass party and (functional) local 
branches carry door-to-door campaigns, 
ANC members are directly confronted by 
residents demanding answers and accounts 
on promises made. Outside election times, 
the need for the branch to constantly 
recruit and mobilize members
14
 leads it to 
try and develop answers to residents’ 
concerns. 
 
3.2. Party hierarchies: 
providing more efficient 
                                                 
14 In order to be able to send delegates to higher 
level decision-making structures in the ANC, a 
branch has to be “functional”, e.g. to have more 
than 100 members (Darracq 2008). 




 that the ANC 
hierarchized structure (ward, zone, region, 
province) and party networks offer quite 
efficient channels for information and 
requests to go from the ground to the top 
(whatever “the top” may be, for different 
types of urban issues). To an extent that 
remains to be defined, ANC caucuses are 
places of debate on urban issues (Low et al 
2007), whereby, in particular, individual 
councilors raise issues pertaining to their 
ward– and they seem to do so more 
efficiently than in Council structures, 
where voting discipline is too crucial to be 
publically jeopardized by contradictory 
debates within the ranks of ANC 
councilors.  
Indeed, the ANC structure includes 
different scales of representation offering 
functional platforms for locally-specific 
concerns to be raised: ward and zonal 
committees regroup wards of a similar 
urban and social profile and therefore 
define functional geographical zones: 
inner city, Soweto, Alexandra, etc. This is 
not the case in Johannesburg council 
structure, which has been shaped to avoid 
regional representation beyond the ward 
level
16
, in order to distance it from former 
apartheid segregated local government 
structures. Secondly, even if one should 
not overestimate party control over lower 
                                                 
15 While research on ANC branches has been 
engaged with since 2006 through the study of civil 
society and participation dynamics, I have only 
recently focused on the ANC internal dynamics. 
The evidence I have gathered so far stems mostly 
from the local level, and observations at council 
municipal and committee levels; I have only 
indirect evidence on vertical accountability within 
the ANC, and on decision-making processes at 
supra-local levels within the ANC. 
16 Except for administrative regions whose power 
remains to be tested: Mabin 2009. 
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party structures such as branches
17
, there is 
a quite efficient and rapid procedure to 
have information transferred from the 
branch level to the zone, to the region and 
sometimes to the provincial level of the 
party: in contrast with the way municipal 
council works, which is far from being 
that simple and clear, especially since its 
restructuring according to New Public 
Management principles, leading to a high 
level of fragmentation (Bénit-Gbaffou 
2008). 
Outside the ANC quite hierarchical 
procedure, there are also possible shortcuts 
used by ANC members, using their 
personal ANC network to have their view 
considered at higher scales and levels of 
power. This is well illustrated in Box 3, 
where local residents succeeded in having 
their voice heard through the brokerage of 
the ANC local branch, which used its 
political connections to have the Mayoral 
Committee pressuring irresponsive local 
municipal structures. 
 
Box 3 - ANC group sidelining the municipal 
hostel manager to access the Mayor 
 
In Area D hostel18, conflicts are rife between the 
hostel’s management (Joshco, Johannesburg Social 
Housing Company – a municipal entity) and 
tenants’ organizations. Joshco works with a local 
Tenants Committee, which lacks local legitimacy – 
considered too cooperative with Joshco, never 
                                                 
17 There is often a gap between the ANC elite’s 
vision and that of local ANC representatives 
(councilors or ANC branch executives), as 
reflected by the disjuncture experienced during the 
May 2008 xenophobic attacks. Whilst the ANC 
national leadership condemned xenophobia, local 
councilors and members of ANC local branches 
(confronted more directly by the pressure of their 
voting base) sometimes participated in fueling the 
conflict (Misago 2009). 
18 Hostels were part of the apartheid migrant labor 
system. Laborers were sent to urban areas without 
their families, on a supposedly temporary basis. 
Hostels were managed by traditional chiefs, 
collaborating with apartheid authorities to maintain 
these rural linkages. 
holding public meetings nor conducting elections. 
In contrast, ANC and SANCO (South African 
National Civics Organisation)19 ward structures are 
holding well-attended public meetings and are 
collecting tenants’ grievances on a number of 
issues (rent level, electricity rates, issues of rental 
lease, etc.).  
One of such grievances is the high electricity tariffs 
charged by Joshco’s chosen subcontractor. The 
Alliance’s complaint to Joshco has fallen onto deaf 
ears. While SANCO has used intimidating and 
violent tactics, the ANC branch has rather 
attempted to side-line Joshco and pressurize it from 
the top. It has used both ANC and trade unions 
networks (the hostel is reserved for municipal 
employees, all unionized) to bring the issues at the 
Mayoral Committee level20. Joshco has 
subsequently changed its subcontractor, and 
electricity tariffs have been revised. 
 
 
Using one’s political networks is often 
efficient in finding pragmatic solutions 
and forcing unresponsive local authorities 
or entities to listen to residents’ claims. 
However, these networks are fragile. 
Zuma’s election in May 2009 has for 
instance led to the restructuring of the 
ANC regional executive
21
, and, as a 
consequence, to the reshuffling of 
Johannesburg Mayoral Committee. For 
Area D ANC branch, who had established 
working relationships with the previous 
Mayoral Committee (Box 3), this has 
                                                 
19 Civics are local residents associations (usually in 
low-income areas). The term emerged in the 1980s 
where local resistance to apartheid gained visibility 
in urban townships, in the form of rent boycott, 
attempts to render townships ungovernable, etc. A 
national federation of civics, SANCO, was 
subsequently created. Since 1994 it has forged an 
alliance with the ANC, depriving it to some extent 
of its necessary critical distance towards the (now 
democratic) government. 
20 The Mayoral committee is the Council’s 
executive branch, consisting of ten ANC 
councillors appointed by the Mayor, under the 
advice of the ANC region. 
21 Mayor Amos Masondo, belonging to the Mbeki 
faction, has been reelected as the ANC Regional 
Chair, but with a very slim majority, and therefore 
saw his mayoral power weakened. 
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meant they had to start again their 
networking process. Personal political 
networks are more fragile and difficult to 
maintain than public anonymous 
departments and functions (Chatterjee 
2004). 
These political networks, often built 
during the struggle
22
, are binding people 
from diverse social origins and positions 
within the ANC
23
. In this respect, and in 
the context of factionalism, ANC members 
are often playing one type of network, or 
ANC or government structure, versus 
another. Box 4 shows how different types 
of networks within government and the 
party can be played by different local 
agents in their competition for public 
resources. 
 
Box 4 - How a former bank robber connects to a 
top rank official in Gauteng Provincial 
Legislature 
 
In a public housing complex within area C2, two 
local civics are competing to appear as “the” 
legitimate residents representative body by local 
government, in order to be the better positioned to 
get public resources (e.g. contracts for the 
renovation of the flats).  
The most established civic has a long-standing 
working relationship with the Provincial Housing 
Department (which manages the complex) – and 
gets most of the contracts for its constituency. The 
second one, newly established, is gaining power 
through the ANC. Led by a former ANC activist 
(who claims he used to rob banks to fill the coffers 
of the ANC underground), the civic runs the ANC 
campaigns in the complex, an opposition party 
stronghold. Through his network established 
during the struggle, the former bank robber also 
has linkages with top ANC leaders and is able to 
access the Provincial Legislature (which has a 
                                                 
22 ‘The struggle’ in a South African context refers 
to the broad area of opposition to the apartheid 
state. ‘Belonging to the struggle’, or having 
belonged to it, is still a key element in legitimizing 
positions of power within the state or the ANC – it 
defines the credentials of an individual. 
23 Such socially heterogeneous networks might 
gradually lose their importance, possibly replaced 
by others, more socially homogeneous. 
section dealing with community participation) to 
put pressure on the Provincial Housing Department 
and marginalize the more established civic. 
 
 
What is apparent in these stories is the 
intricacies of ANC and state structures and 
networks, and the fact that the former are 
used extensively to access the state at its 
decision-making levels – in order to avoid 
being stuck at the lower level of the 
municipal administration or political 
power (ward committee and councilor). It 
is partly explained by the inability of such 
ground-level state structures or 
representatives to provide answers to local 
requests or needs, and the necessity of 
scale-jumping in order to reach decision-
making levels of the state. The ANC 
structure and networks provide a useful, 
possibly efficient, bridge to those higher 
levels of government. In a way it shows 
the invention of a new space of 
participation, in response to the failure of 
the municipal participatory spaces. But it 
also relies on, and entertains, a confusion 
between the state and the party that the 
rise of factionalism within the ANC has 
probably recently increased. 
 
3.3. Limits to 
discussions and challenges 
to urban policies 
If belonging to the ANC local branch 
offers a space to raise local issues, it has 
obvious limitations in the extent to which 
existing public / ANC policies can be 
questioned. This varies from branch to 
branch, and the extent to which local 
leaders can be critical or turbulent within 
the ANC depends on many factors. In any 
case, the party does not tolerate criticism 
made by party-members outside of the 
party, in particular in newspapers – 
following its political culture marked by 
democratic centralism (Johnson 2003). 
The most famous example is the case of 
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Trevor Ngwane, former ANC councilor in 
Soweto: after having publicly expressed 
his opposition to the municipal strategy of 
commodification of water, he had no 
choice but to leave the party. Other local 
ANC activists, also impressed by some 
devastating effects of this policy on the 
ground, prefer to keep quiet: “personally I 
am not favorable to [the commodification 
of water]; but politically I am supporting 
it” (ANC branch executive member, area 
C2). Challenges from ANC local branches 
to municipal/ANC policies are limited to 
questions relating to a specific project, or 
to its implementation – it is seldom a 
challenge over a policy direction, or an 
input on a possible new one.  
This however is not very different from 
other existing channels of collective action 
– low-income residents’ voices in urban 
governance are seldom able to intervene at 
policy level. In African cities, their 
strength often resides in their possible 
opposition to policy or project 
implementation through active or passive 
resistance, using their mass to possibly 
block a project, a site, an access point (Fox 
1969; Blundo and Olivier de Sardan 
2001). Gay (1999) also argues, from a 
Brazilian urban perspective, that some 
clientelist exchanges are delivering more 
collective goods to the poor than generous 
but never implemented pro-poor policies. 
Without denying that social movements 
can impact the fate of the poor in cities of 
the South through policy change, it is 
worth considering the small improvements 
and interventions that low-income 
residents are able to achieve, through, in 
particular, their local party branch 
affiliation. It might be that these small 
changes are only consolidating existing 
power structures; but the outcomes of 
these engagements between residents and 
the party/state are never fixed or 
predetermined (Williams, 2004; Corbridge 
et al. 2005; Cornwall, 2007). Such tiny 
improvement (thanks to the ANC branch), 
failing to challenge the overall City 
“global city” policy but certainly 
meaningful for residents, are illustrated in 
Box 5: 
 
Box 5 - The fate of a community soccer field: 
local ANC branch the only force challenging the 
municipal project 
 
Preparing for the 2010 Soccer World Cup, Area B1 
was undergoing rapid change: the local community 
soccer field was being converted, under the 
auspices of the Johannesburg Development Agency 
(JDA: a municipal structure managed 
independently), into a Cricket Club.  
The project raised residents’ outrage, on several 
bases. First, as soccer is still considered a sport 
‘for’ Blacks and cricket a sport ‘for’ Indians, Black 
residents (a majority in the area, also generally 
poorer than local Indian residents) felt 
marginalized from what used to be ‘their’ space. 
Secondly, the conversion entrenches a shift from a 
community facility to a (global?) select ‘club’, 
possibly excluding local residents. Thirdly, in the 
soccer frenzy for the 2010 Cup, depriving local 
residents of the opportunity to play soccer is 
unfortunate – there is no alternative soccer field in 
the area. 
Residents raised the issue in a JDA meeting, in 
vain. They wrote a petition that they sent to JDA, 
in vain. They did not approach their (opposition 
party) councilor, because of their ANC loyalty; 
instead, they brought the issue to their local ANC 
branch, which obtained a meeting with JDA. 
Worried that the ANC leaders could block the 
project, JDA agreed to build an alternative 
community soccer field in the area – an outcome 
that residents alone had not managed to get. 
 
 
As is the case with this community soccer 
field, low-income residents systematically 
engage with the ANC local branch in order 
to get a collective good, and ANC leaders 
take the lead. They act as a civic structure 
would, bargaining and putting pressure on 
the municipality. Branches can be efficient 
thanks to their potential political power, 
that City officials or agencies fear all the 
more that it is rather undefined: which 
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ANC networks are branch members able 
to mobilize? At what level? How 
powerful? The structure of organized 
residents’ relationships with the ANC is 
however different from what has been 
described in Brazilian cities as collective 
clientelism (Gay 1998) – whereby a group 
of residents offers its collective political 
support to the politician who will provide 
them with a collective good (electrification 
of the area, recreation center, etc.). In 
Johannesburg, competition between 
political parties is limited, even in wards 
led by opposition parties, as in area B1 just 
mentioned: there, political loyalty towards 
the ANC was still too strong for residents 
to have considered approaching the 
opposition councilor, although she might 
have been supportive, especially as it was 
election times. The two stories below (Box 
6) reflect the fact that “clients” are still 
quite shy in their use of bargaining tactics 
with their “patrons”, in South African 
cities:  
 
Box 6 - Individual versus collective clientelism – 
still learning the rules of the game? 
 
Teresa, the ward committee member for health in 
2000-2005, was awarded a contract by the City of 
Johannesburg to carry out a survey on HIV/AIDS 
in Area C1 informal settlements. She left her job at 
a local clinic to run the project. On the eve of the 
2006 local elections, the ID24 approached her to 
stand as their candidate in a neighbouring ward 
(Area C2), which she accepted: but she lost the 
elections. In the meantime her contract was 
terminated by the City– accusing her of using her 
survey in Area C1 to campaign for the ID (even 
though she was standing in another ward). She lost 
everything: her job, her contract, her political 
position and credibility; because she did not 
understand the nature (clientelist/ personal) of the 
“contract”. 
 
                                                 
24 The Independent Democrats (ID) is a party 
created in 2003 and popular especially in Coloured 
areas. It formed an alliance with the Democratic 
Alliance (DA) in 2010, to try and consolidate a 
credible opposition to the ANC. 
Alvina, leader of an informal settlement in Area C1 
and chair of the Area C Development Forum 
(gathering a number of local civics), used to be an 
ANC member. When a DA councillor was elected 
in her ward in 2000, she cooperated with her –“I 
just want development to take place”. Subsequently 
she was expelled from the ANC. She was 
approached by the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)25 
which requested her to help organise a meeting 
with all informal settlements residents. It was not 
an organized deal, though; it could have been the 
case, since Alvina reckons that “those people can 
deliver! […] They can have their voice heard! 
They just bring people from the hostels and have 
them toyi-toyi [protest], and get they what they 
want”. However she did not bargain her support 
nor did she discuss possible political support from 
the area to the IFP, in exchange for IFP provision 
of collective goods. 
 
 
Time has come (yet) for collective 
clientelism, whereby groups of residents 
have enough political astuteness (or 
cynicism) to bargain with a variety of 
politicians to get local collective benefits– 
limiting for the moment Gay’s argument 
about clientelism as form of 
accountability. In any case, whilst the 
ANC branches are offering a platform for 
local debate, democratic participation, and 
even some accountability, it is important 
to stress the limitations of such platforms. 
They cannot engage meaningfully with 
residents’ deeper criticisms on broader 
ANC or municipal policies, such as the 
urban growth and renewal agenda that is 
affecting lower-income residents mostly 
negatively, especially in the inner city 
(through evictions; rising rents; frustration 
                                                 
25 Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) is an opposition 
party defending the Zulu traditional and cultural 
values. Its basis is found mostly in rural areas in 
the Province of KwaZulu Natal, but also in urban 
hostels where migrant workers (often originating 
from this region) are concentrated. IFP-dominated 
hostels were often at the core of urban conflict in 
the 1990s within the townships, in violent 
confrontation with ANC-dominated township 
residents. 
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to see public funding being spent without 
it benefiting local residents; etc.). The 
understanding of these limitations is 
clearly displayed in Box 7, narrating the 
ANC branch reaction to a massive public 
expression of xenophobia. 
 
Box 7- Condemning xenophobia, but not 
deconstructing the scape-goating process – How 
could the ANC say, ‘It is not them, it’s us!’ 
 
(Fieldwork diary, 01.04.09) 
 
It is pre-election time, and the ANC local branch in 
[Area B1] is actively campaigning for Zuma, the 
ANC national candidate for Presidency. An ANC 
meeting is called. It is packed, mainly with Black 
residents (although the area is mixed, with poor 
Whites, Coloured and Indian residents): we are 
expecting the Mayor of Johannesburg, who 
happens to live in the ward and therefore belongs 
to the branch. 
I am wondering what he will say to praise the ANC 
in this specific ward, which has seen evictions as 
the result of the municipal urban renewal policy. A 
skilled politician, he avoids as much as possible 
talking about the ward, rather praising ANC 
national policies and highlighting general urban 
policies. 
Questions burst out: what are you doing about 
foreigners taking our houses, our jobs, our wives, 
our social services, bringing crime into the 
country? 
The Mayor is embarrassed, as well as the ANC 
local leadership. He condemns xenophobia, 
reminds the audience that we do not want another 
outburst of violence after last year’s events (exactly 
one year ago), and asks the residents to be 
understanding. He states that not much can be done 
(“migration cannot be stopped, it can be 
managed”), and reminds that thousands of South 
Africans live abroad – what would happen if they 
were chased away? And that is all. 
And in petto, I think… of course. The ANC can’t 
say “it is not them [the foreigners], it is us 
[government / the ANC], who are evicting you, not 
providing enough affordable houses, social 
services, access to basic services”. It would be 
suicidal for the party. But as they can’t say that, 
they cannot efficiently fight xenophobia, other than 
with abstract arguments that cannot answer the 
question: “why can’t I find a decent and affordable 
house?” Educating the masses… but not to criticize 
the party.  
 
 
4. The relationships between the ANC 
and other civil society organizations 
– from subtle social control to 
intolerance for opposition? 
ANC local branches, when active, are 
providing a space for local democracy –
space of debate, space of engagement 
between residents and the state. But this 
space is not autonomous from the rest of 
civil society: the ANC has an important 
influence in other civil society 
organizations, directly and indirectly. It is 
shaping to some extent their strategies and 
their access to resource and to voice, at 
least in two respects. First, the ANC 
deploys its cadres, more or less explicitly, 
to the main other social structures 
implemented locally. Secondly, there are 
few local civic leaders who do not belong 
to, or at least sympathize with, the ANC. 
This intricate relationship between non-
ANC local organizations and ANC 
branches is understandable; but it leads to 
a form of social control inhibiting 
criticism towards the party and 
government policies. 
 
4.1. Party strategy – 
different forms and 
degrees of deployment 
into civil society 
organizations and 
participatory structures 
ANC local branches actively deploy their 
local cadres into various civil society 
organizations. This is not necessarily 
illegitimate – the ANC often represents a 
major organization locally, and as such 
can have representatives in forums aiming 
at representing civil society in its diversity. 
It is only logical that ANC members end 
up numerous in other civic organizations – 
and sometimes it is not the result of any 
specific strategy. There is however a 
difference between deploying an ANC 
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cadre as representing the ANC in a 
structure (with other stakeholders’ 
representatives), and deploying an ANC 
cadre to become the (supposedly non-
partisan) executive member of another 
structure. It is often the case in heavily 
politicized ward committees (Deacon and 
Piper 2008), even though they have 




chaired by ANC members deployed by the 
party: it is the case in all of the 5 case 
studies. 
Depending on the personality and local 
legitimacy of the ANC deployed member, 
and the fierceness of local competition, 
ANC presence in the executive committee 
of those two participatory bodies (ward 
committee and CPF) can happen 
peacefully and almost un-noticed, or 
become a political battle. In Area A, the 
ANC Youth League bussed supporters to 
take over the CPF leadership, and 
succeeded in doing so. During ward 
committee elections, especially in wards 
won by opposition parties, the game is for 
each party to mobilize as many supporters 
as possible. The ANC being the only mass 
party able to mobilize members in big 
numbers, often ends up the winner in such 
games. These strategies and counter-
strategies to win over elected structures 
are well illustrated by the shifts in the 
ways ward committees members have 
been elected over time – in an incremental 
path towards democracy (Box 8): 
 
Box 8 - From secrecy to democratization to 
technicization – local battles for the ward 
committee 
 
After the 2000 municipal elections came the time 
to elect the first ward committees in Johannesburg. 
No one knew really how this was to happen. Often 
                                                 
26 Community Policing Forums are statutory 
bodies, where residents and police officers meet 
regularly around local security issues. 
it was the councilor who called local residents to 
stand as candidates – and sometimes residents’ 
participation was minimal. Other times, especially 
in opposition-parties' strongholds, the ANC 
mobilized its members en masse, to be part of the 
meeting and be elected as ward committee 
members. This sometimes led to highly 
dysfunctional ward committees – where the 
purpose was  to block the councilor and the 
committee rather than to work with her (Mohamed 
2006). 
 
After the 2006 municipal elections, Area B1 DA 
councilor, in order to prevent the local ANC to take 
over the ward committee, had to mobilize her 
supporters and, more broadly (as the DA is not a 
mass party), publicize the election widely in the 
ward. She requested each candidate to campaign on 
the spot, and tell the audience why they stood for 
their specific portfolio and how they would 
contribute. While some candidates were obviously 
elected according to party affiliation and racial 
profile, some managed to convince a great majority 
of voters across party, race and class.  
In area B2, an IFP ward, both IFP and ANC had 
nominated their candidates for ward committee 
positions. Both parties managed to mobilize their 
constituencies equally, and there were fears of 
clashes, as there is a history of IFP-ANC violence 
in the area27. In order to defuse tension, the IFP 
councilor and the ANC branch chair struck a deal: 
the ward committee members were to be 
nominated equally by each party (5 for the IFP, 5 
for the ANC). Non-aligned civics or residents 
might have been frustrated, but they were not 
sufficiently organized to raise the issue. 
 
In 2009, mid-term ward committee elections, 
however, the election process had become more 
bureaucratic – in order to avoid outsiders to be 
brought in to vote. Candidates had to register much 
in advance, and voters had to be checked on the 
ward list. Moreover, the vote did not take place in a 
public meeting: voters just came, voted and went 
away – the voting office, supervised by the 
Independent Electoral Commission, was open the 
whole day. Paradoxically therefore, this tightening 
of rules has limited public debate and engagement 




                                                 
27 See note 22. 
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Even with more sophisticated electoral or 
organizational systems, the ANC has a 
comparative advantage on other political 
parties and on civil society organizations – 
in its mass character; its ability to 
mobilize; its organization skills and 
political training. Although some civic 
organizations have developed specific 
constitutional or electoral measures to 
avoid being “hijacked” by ANC members, 
in some cases they appear relatively 
powerless when the ANC has decided 
either to block their relationship with the 
state; or to take over the leadership of the 
organization. When political strategies do 
not work, and in specific cases of high 
local tensions, physical violence can also 
be resorted to as a means to weaken or 
delegitimise oppositional organizations, as 
seen in Abahlali baseMjondolo mentioned 
above. In the absence of spaces of public 
debate that can accommodate strongly 
opposed views, violence might be the only 
way the ANC can address a movement 
that is gaining power outside of the control 
of the party. 
 
4.2. Civil society 
organizations’ leaders – 
engagements with 
political parties 
It would be wrong however to think that 
civic organizations are purely “victims” of 
ANC strategies of “entry”. Some 
organizations fiercely fight to remain 
independent from any political affiliations, 
and even refuse to engage in elections 
(such is the case with most social 
movements: Abahlali baseMjondolo, the 
Anti Eviction Campaign, the Landless 
People’s Movement). The call for a 
boycott does not mean a lack of 
engagement with political parties, even if 
it is conflict-driven; even radical 
movements adopt a variety of strategies 
ranging from cooperation to confrontation, 
depending on shifts in opportunities 
(Oldfield 2008). Other social movements 
criticize election boycotts, considering 
them a renouncing of the will to transform 
society positively. They more directly 
engage in the electoral game, presenting 
candidates in local elections, as 
independent or part of new local political 
parties - such as the OKM, Operation 
Khanyisa Movement
28
, emanating from 
the Anti Privatisation Forum.  
But apart from this radical fraction of civil 
society, the majority of small, locally-
based, problem-oriented civil society 
organizations are much more intertwined 
with the dominant party. Local leaders are 
generally also ANC members – not 
because they have been deployed in the 
organization by the ANC, but in order to 
maximize access to information, resource 
and opportunities. This is well illustrated 
by Thabiseng’s story (Box 9) –
representative of many local activists. 
 













                                                 
28 Khanyisa means ‘switch the light on’, in 
reference to the Anti Privatisation Forum’s 
operations in Soweto: reconnecting residents 
whose electricity has been cut off due to non-
payment. OKM did not manage to raise a 
significant number of votes in the 2006 local 
elections (enough though it gained one PR seat in 
Council), first because of the lack of geographical 
concentration of its supporters (failing to win a 
ward), and because it is seen as too radical and too 
confrontational with the ANC by township 
residents (Ndletyana 2007). 
 
Draft version of paper published in Geoforum, Special issue on Party Politics, the Poor and the City, 2012, 



















































































































Draft version of paper published in Geoforum, Special issue on Party Politics, the Poor and the City, 2012, 



















































































































Draft version of paper published in Geoforum, Special issue on Party Politics, the Poor and the City, 2012, 



















































































































Draft version of paper published in Geoforum, Special issue on Party Politics, the Poor and the City, 2012, 



















































































































Draft version of paper published in Geoforum, Special issue on Party Politics, the Poor and the City, 2012, 



















































































































Draft version of paper published in Geoforum, Special issue on Party Politics, the Poor and the City, 2012, 



















































































































Draft version of paper published in Geoforum, Special issue on Party Politics, the Poor and the City, 2012, 



























Thabiseng’s ability to display different 
identities in different contexts is analyzed 
by Simone (2004a) as a rewarding tactics 
in times of uncertainty and scarce 
opportunities; and also as a sign of the 
“fluidity” of power positions in 
contemporary African cities. This latter 
analysis however can be debated: tactics 
such as Thabiseng’s require time and 
commitment. One needs to build one’s 
networks and sustain it through a constant 
reminding of one’s presence and loyalty 
(Auyero 1999). If positions within each 
field of power are fragile and easily 
contested, they are not easy to obtain, and 
not everybody can find themselves 
enjoying the benefits of these intertwined 
linkages. In other words, power patterns 
are not fluid, and rather tend to consolidate 
themselves – from a position of power it is 
possible to build other positions of power 
in different, although connected, networks. 
Fluidity however exists in political 
affiliations and loyalties, according to 
political opportunities – even if the ease 
with which one changes political 
affiliation (“political transhumance”) 
might not yet be as strong in the South 
African ANC as in many other African 
parties (Erdmann 2004; Gazibo 2006). In 
an ANC-dominated party system, in an 
ANC government and after a political 
struggle that consolidated powerful 
networks, the price of political volatility 
might still be too high, as seen above when 
stressing the limited use of collective 
clientelist strategies (Box 6). Only in some 
specific contexts, where there seems to be 
little to lose (for instance in Coloured 
townships where the ANC political 
investment has traditionally been low), do 
local leaders seek affiliation with any 
political party willing to adopt them: see 
Box 10.  
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Box 10- Civic leaders’ struggles – becoming 
councilor, no matter for what party 
 
Most ward candidates for ward C1 and C2 (Table 
2) are former civic leaders, standing for non-ANC 
parties – as independent, but more often for 
opposition parties such as DA, ID, and even 
Nadeco29. Interestingly (but not exceptionally) the 
candidates chosen by the ANC have very limited 
grounding in local activism. 
 
Profiles of ward candidates in Area D (divided 



















The very same civic leaders who have been 
strongly arguing for access to free basic services 
are now standing for the DA or the IFP (whose 
ideologies and policies are not sympathetic to those 
ideas), or busy marketing or implementing pre-paid 
meters for the City. Sometimes, individual political 
aspiration even overcomes commitment to the area 
(as one leader accepted to stand for the ID in 
Melville, a middle class suburban area). Their 
nomination as (any) party representatives 
constitutes a way to get power, recognition, and 
maybe (if they are elected local councilor) a salary. 
 
 
Such political fluidity remains uncommon, 
at least in Johannesburg where the ANC is 
locally dominant, as residents or local 
leaders have more interests in showing 
persistent loyalty to the ANC – on top of 
personal histories and identities that also 
                                                 
29 Nadeco was formed in 2005, splitting from the 
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). 
might make it difficult to part from the 
liberation party, no matter how much one 
disagrees with its current policies (Matlala 
2009). 
 
4.3. Forms of social 
control and intolerance 
for organized opposition 
These intertwined belongings, multiplying 
the chances of getting access to 
information and resource, however have 
their counterpart. They mean that the ANC 
is able to exert, through its members 
(mandated or not to do so), a subtle but 
efficient social control on what is said in 
residents’ collective meetings. How far 
debates can go, how far government 
policies or ANC government can be 
criticized and in which manner, is shaped 
by everyone’s perception that their 
discourse and position might be reported 
to ANC local structures. The climate is not 
generally one of suspicion and 
surveillance, although factionalism within 
the ANC, as well as the recent rise of 
COPE as a splinter-group from the ANC
30
, 
have certainly led to tensions in public 
space. 
 
Box 11 - Collective social control and limitations 
to local debates in public participatory spaces 
 
In area A, a forum has been established to serve as 
a platform for residents’ local concerns – gathering 
a number of local civics (including political parties 
such as the ANC and COPE), and attempting to 
trigger debates on local issues. Although its chair is 
an executive ANC member, as well as his founder, 
this forum has been fighting to keep its 
                                                 
30 COPE is a splinter-group from the ANC. It was 
formed after the ANC Polokwane conference in 
2007 which elected Zuma at the head of the party 
and defeated the Mbeki faction (see note 7). 
Relying on similar struggle credentials as the ANC, 
as manifested through its contested name (COPE: 
Congress of the People, one of the key moments in 
the ANC history), COPE has been seen in several 
Black townships as a serious threat to the ANC 
hegemony. 
Ward candidate 2006 Former political activity 
Ward C1 ANC No former civic nor political activity (ANC branch member) 
Ward C1 DA Former leader of civic, former ID P rty regio al secretary 
Ward C1 ID Ward committee member in WC1 
Ward C1 Independent Civic activist: Community Independent Development Forum (CIDF) 
Ward C2 ANC Councillor (elected as DA in 2000, crossed the floor; no previous civic 
involvement) 
Ward C2 ID Ward committee member in ward C1 (had been the ID candidate in ward 
C1 in previous elections) 
Ward C2 Nadeco Civic activist: Sowejoca*. Linked with IFP but IFP chose another, Zulu, 
candidate 
Ward X (Melville) ID Civic leader (wanted to stand as the ID candidate for ward C2 but the ID 
had already appointed a candidate there– the ID deployed him to Melville) 
*Sowejoca was a radical civic during the struggle with a strong cultural dimension – arguing for the promotion of 
the Coloured identity. This dimension created the basis for an alliance with the IFP, around the need to actively 
recognize and advance the rights of various cultural groups. 
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independence, both from the ANC and from the 
councilor, who sees in this forum a direct 
competitor to her ward committee. The matter has 
been aggravated by the recent award to the forum 
of a substantial grant to develop a community 
strategic vision for the area. 
During the forum 2009 annual general meeting, 
COPE representative questions the position of the 
forum regarding municipal policies: couldn’t the 
forum push for the City to be more accountable to 
residents, about several promises that have been 
made and not fulfilled (the provision of more 
opportunities for traders; the completion of the 
community center, etc.)? Immediately, a member 
of the forum (also ANC Youth League activist) 
jumps out and starts discarding this proposal, 
saying it is out of order, that “we are not here to 
make political statements: [our forum] is neutral, 
not a political body”. Although the chair protests 
and asserts that every forum member is allowed to 
mention its organization, including political ones, 
the discussion stops there – it won’t take place. 
 
 
Not knowing to what extent one is being 
watched by the others in those public 
spaces, and if one’s discourse will be 
reported to the ANC, participants in public 
meetings are generally very careful not to 
associate themselves, or even be perceived 
as associating themselves, with the 
political “enemy”- which varies according 
to local contexts. In some places, the 
enemy is COPE (area A, area E); in others 
(area C1, area E), it is radical social 
movements like the Anti Privatisation 
Forum (Box 12). Inviting them to public 
meetings or to forums, engaging with them 
publically is seen as a betrayal, and their 
members are fled and ostracized like 
contagious disease carrying people, even if 
other organizations might be sympathetic 
to their struggle. 
 
Box 12 – Organizing a Pan-African carnival in 
Area E 
 
Notes from an activist perspective 
 
During the xenophobic violence occurring in May 
2008, I was part of the creation of a non-profit 
organization aimed at consolidating an integrated 
South African society: the African Diaspora 
Forum, a forum gathering a number of African 
migrants’ organizations.  
One of our first endeavors was to work in areas 
where xenophobic violence had been rife. This was 
the case for area E, where we were approached by 
the local CPF to help healing the wounds – we 
thought of jointly organizing a Pan-African 
Carnival in the township, based on deep 
engagement with local schools, with the official 
support of local councilors and the Gauteng 
Department of Education (GDE). While workshops 
within the schools worked beautifully for a couple 
of months, local politics came into the way and 
eventually prevented the event taking place. 
One week before the planned carnival, the 
dominant (ANC aligned) teachers union pretended 
not to have been properly consulted and threatened 
to halt the process violently. They called for an 
urgent meeting, inviting selected local civics. We 
went in with our local partners, the CPF, but also 
the local branch of the Anti Privatisation Forum 
(APF) - we had been working with them and they 
were the only local organization to openly include 
foreigners. As soon as the APF entered the meeting 
room, our partner the CPF withdrew its support and 
said they were not responsible for their coming. 
Even if it was obviously a pretext, the teachers 
union as well as the CPF explained the failure of 
the negotiation by APF presence (although APF 
representatives did not utter a word). 
The carnival was cancelled for many reasons: 
misconception that much money was involved in 
the event, in which civics and unions wanted their 
share; political rivalry within the ANC between the 
trade union and the GDE leaders; deeply-
entrenched xenophobic feelings. Significant to me 
however, is the fact that it was commonly accepted 
that the APF is not an organization one can or 
should talk to, not to say work with. 
 
 
This form of light but permanent social 
control by party members on who is 
showing loyal support and who is more 
dubious or mild in her party credentials, is 
at the basis of clientelism in many low-
income areas of cities of the South 
(Auyero 1999). In democratic societies 
where the vote ballot is secret and 
elections are relatively free and fair, 
patrons’ control over the political loyalty 
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of their constituencies rests on this high 
degree of interconnectedness and 
collective social control – not necessarily 
articulated and manipulated from the top, 
but occurring through the individual 
competition for access to resources, in 
which a good relationship with the 
dominant party is key. In this sense, the 
ANC is not very different from other 
parties in Africa and in the global South, 
where public resources are scarce 
compared to the scale of social needs, and 
where the efficiency of state bureaucracy 
in delivering access is limited – rendering 
the mediation of the party crucial to access 
public resources (Khan 2005, Kitschelt 
and Wilkinson 2007). The relative solidity 
of South African administration, and the 
existence of a welfare state policy in some 
respects (existence of a national pension 
scheme, a child grant scheme, etc.), 
however make the extent of political 
clientelism possibly less important than in 
most countries of the South. 
Nevertheless, there seems to be a rise in 
the role of the party in civil society, 
possibly to be linked to the rising 
politicization of the state apparatus, in a 
context of party factionalism. It remains to 
be explored whether factionalism opens 
new arenas for internal party debates by 
increasing competition within the party (as 
suggested by Darracq 2008), or creates 
more political opacity for common 
residents and party members. Party 
factionalism is possibly a transitional 
phase, if South African is to follow the 
Indian example (Reddy 2005); or the end 
of South African exceptionalism in Africa, 
if one is more pessimistic (Gazibo 2006). 
On the way towards the 2011 local 
elections, one can stress the growing 
intolerance, and apparently more brutal 
repression, of dissent and opposition in 
civil society. This “new” political 
intolerance for dissent, or the “rising” 
penetration of the ANC into civil society 
structures, however needs to be questioned 
historically. As much as there is a strong 
internal democratic culture within the 
ANC, there has been a historical 
intolerance of the underground ANC 
against other anti-apartheid struggle 
movements like the Pan Africanist 
Congress (PAC) for instance - a splinter 
movement from the ANC that could 
appear also as a legitimate anti-apartheid 
movement and therefore was seen as a 
competitor, both in exile and in South 
Africa (Kondlo 2008). Similarly, and 
again in the context of the struggle against 
apartheid where the ANC was banned, the 
ANC has often been establishing a 
political monopoly over local space and 
social control of residents’ political 
loyalties during the 1980s townships 
resistance, to the point of sometimes using 
violent or even criminal practices (see 
Marks 2001 on the political youth in 
Diepkloof, Soweto, for instance). Such a 
culture might be reappearing in the current 
intolerance for radical social movements; 
or even in the current “reinvention”, under 
an ANC banner, of independent struggle 
movements such as the United Democratic 
Front (UDF) (see Fouchard’s paper in this 
issue). But the 2011 elections might also 
be a way of consolidating or even 
deepening the internal ANC democratic 
culture – in the way the choices of party 
candidates are chosen, which involved 
broad local debates beyond the branch 
itself (Polile 2011), raising a number of 
other issues but at least acknowledging 
that ANC ward candidates should 
somehow reflect local preferences. Rising 
political opposition at the local level (the 
most “dangerous” politically for the 
ANC), fear of rising local protests, might 
have led to such openings. 
 
5. Concluding thoughts 
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The ANC, a mass organization and still a 
dominant party a decade after the 
liberation, is strongly embedded in civil 
society in urban low-income areas. Its 
presence, broad and deep, both opens 
channels of resident participation and 
access to a remote and opaque state 
apparatus; and closes opportunities for 
strong opposition and radical debates. This 
paper has shown that the party seems to be 
more responsive than local government 
structures to residents’ requests or claims, 
both individual and (sometimes) 
collective. The party is indeed more 
concerned with maintaining a mass 
support in its popular constituencies – to 
keep a functional party branch that will 
grant it a say in party decisions- than local 
councilors more or less ensured by the 
brand (ANC) that they will be elected. The 
party is also more efficient in some 
instances to address residents’ issues, 
through networked channels of access to 
powerful politicians, as opposed to the 
red-tape and fragmentation of the current 
local government system. A second 
important argument of this paper is that 
the ANC secures and reproduces its 
presence in low-income areas, and in its 
community based and local organizations, 
through deployment into the various forms 
and instances of civil society; but also 
because of civil society’s leaders own 
agency, having an interest in showing 
sympathy or loyalty to the dominant and 
ruling party. This presence allows for 
subtle or less subtle forms of social control 
exerted locally, at least in areas showing 
some urban stability. 
These conclusions partly resonate with the 
Chatterjeean concept of “political society”, 
where the poor’s (the “majority of the 
people”) multiple relationships with the 
state are generally mediated through local 
arrangements with local leaders, 
politicians and junior officials. This 
mediation helps filling gaps (broad 
especially in Cities of the South) between 
unrealistic urban laws and regulations and 
existing urban realities characterized by 
mass poverty (Benjamin 2004; Roy 2005); 
and between broad welfare policies and 
lack of administrative or financial 
capacities to implement them (Gay 1999; 
Khan 2005). But this mediation also 
contributes to reproduce existing power 
structures by limiting the expression of 
different or opposing views to the 
dominant ones, on the one hand; and by 
limiting, to some extent, broader policy 
changes that could directly benefit the 
poor, on the other. 
The paper resonates only partly with 
Chatterjee’s political society, because the 
paper here has focused on the relationship 
between the poor, their local leaders, and 
party politics: putting aside –for now- the 
third pole of the “political society”: local 
administration, an important element in 
the relationship between the poor and the 
State (accessed directly or lobbied by local 
politicians for delivery of various goods), 
well documented in Indian cities 
(Benjamin 2004; Bawa forthcoming) and 
starting to become the focus of attention 
elsewhere (Rubin forthcoming; Smith 
forthcoming). By focusing on party 
politics “only”, the paper has brought 
depth into the understanding of everyday 
arrangements between voters and 
politicians, and has uncovered some forms 
of accountability to the poor, unpacking its 
different dimensions – responsiveness (the 
politicians’ ability not only to hear their 
constituencies’ requests but to deliver on 
them); and questionability (the ability of 
constituencies to question politicians’ 
action – this requires both a level of 
transparency and visibility of this action, 
and the capacity to oppose and sanction 
this action) (see Bénit-Gbaffou 
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forthcoming for a further elaboration). 
While this paper has illustrated a degree of 
politicians’ responsiveness to low-income 
residents’ demands, they are certainly not 
easy to question and sanction, in the South 
African current democratic system.  
These statements open to two larger 
questions. Firstly, what are the conditions 
in which the party becomes irreplaceable a 
mediator between residents and the state? 
Informality and the lack of access to rights 
for a big part of the population are 
certainly, as outlined by Chatterjee, a 
sufficient structural explanation; but they 
hardly explain changes and shifts within a 
given society; and, as seen in our case 
studies, not all voters obtaining individual 
or collective favours from a politicians 
(from food parcel to access to housing to 
the creation of a community soccer field...) 
are characterized by this form of informal, 
‘incomplete’ citizenship. Could it be also 
linked to a dysfunctional, opaque or 
fragmented local government system, 
possibly aggravated by the new public 
management principles adopted to 
restructure local government in South 
Africa? Or by an incomplete 
decentralization, giving huge 
responsibilities to local councilors without 
the political and financial means of acting 
upon them? 
Secondly, when one assesses local 
clientelism as a rising form of relationship 
between voters and the state, it is 
important to ask what the conditions are 
for an increased collective clientelism – 
where a group of residents, or a local 
leader, is able to negotiate collective goods 
against mass support. This has been 
analysed in Latin American cities (Gay 
1999) as the main form of political 
accountability to the poor. Conditions for 
collective clientelism to develop (in 
contrast to individual clientelism) certainly 
revolve around increased political 
competition, a strong and structured civil 
society (able to bargain and mobilize 
supporters), and, in the South African 
context, a distance from political 
belonging as based on racial and historical 
identities, towards a more functionalist use 
of party politics. As we move further away 
from 1994, there are certainly more and 
more local areas where these conditions 
are met – leading either to a degree of 
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